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Abstract
Background: Monitoring the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditure, as well as the
impoverishing effects of out of pocket costs to access healthcare, is a key part of benchmarking Kenya’s progress
towards reducing the financial burden that households experience when accessing healthcare.
Methods: The study relies on data from the nationally-representative Kenya Household Expenditure and Utilization
Survey conducted in 2013 (n =33,675). We undertook health equity analysis to estimate the incidence and intensity
of catastrophic expenditure. Households were considered to have incurred catastrophic expenditures if their annual
out of-pocket health expenditures exceeded 40% of their annual non-food expenditure. We assessed the
impoverishing effects of out of pocket payments using the Kenya national poverty line. We distinguished between
direct payments for healthcare such as payments for consultation, medicines, medical procedures, and total
healthcare expenditure that includes direct healthcare payments and the cost of transportation to and from health
facilities. We used logistic regression analysis to explore the factors associated with the incidence of catastrophic
expenditures.
Results: When only direct payments to healthcare providers were considered, the incidence of catastrophic
expenditures was 4.52%. When transport costs are included, the incidence of catastrophic expenditure increased to
6.58%. 453,470 Kenyans are pushed into poverty annually as a result of direct payments for healthcare. When the
cost of transport is included, that number increases by more than one third to 619,541. Unemployment of the
household head, presence of an elderly person, a person with a chronic ailment, a large household size, lower
household social-economic status, and residence in marginalized regions of the country are significantly associated
with increased odds of incurring catastrophic expenditures.
Conclusions: Kenyan policy makers should prioritize extending pre-payment mechanisms to more vulnerable
groups, specifically the poor, the elderly, those suffering from chronic ailments and those living in marginalized
regions of the country. The range of services covered under these mechanisms should also be extended such that
the proportion of direct costs paid to access care is reduced. Policy makers should also prioritize reducing supply
side bottlenecks such as availability of healthcare facilities in close proximity to the population, especially in rural
and marginalized areas, and improvements in quality of care. For the poor and the vulnerable, initiatives to cover
the cost of transport to and from a health facility, such as transport vouchers could also be explored.
Keywords: Household health spending, Out of pocket health spending, Catastrophic health spending, Financial risk
protection, Kenya
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Background
There is increasing commitment by low and middle in-
come countries (LMICs) to achieve universal health cover-
age (UHC) [1], the goal of which is to ensure that
everyone has access to needed healthcare services without
getting into financial ruin or impoverishment [2]. This
commitment has culminated in the inclusion of UHC in
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were
adopted by world leaders in 2015 to articulate global de-
velopment priorities until 2030 [3]. Health systems in
LMICs are still heavily dependent on people making out-
of-pocket (OOP) payments to cover the costs of health-
care at the time when they use the services [4, 5]. Over
100 million people globally are pushed into poverty annu-
ally as a result of OOP healthcare payments [6]. Ensuring
that households are protected from such catastrophic ex-
penditure – also referred to as financial risk protection - is
recognized as a desirable health policy objective [7–10].
Therefore, tracking the extent of financial risk protection
achieved by different countries has been proposed as a key
part of the SDG monitoring framework [11].
Kenya’s health sector is financed by a mix of public,
private, and donor resources. Between 2009 and 2013,
donor financing reduced from 34.5 to 25.6%, while fi-
nancing from public sources increased from 28.8 to
33.5% (Table 1) [12]. Private financing for health in-
creased from 36.7 to 39.8% over the same time period.
This is worrying because a huge proportion of private
funding is in the form of out of pocket (OOP) payments.
Specifically, OOP spending as a proportion of total
health expenditure (THE) increased from 25% in 2009
to 29% in 2013.
The Kenyan government has over the years undertaken
a number of health system reforms that have had an im-
pact on the extent to which the population has financial
risk protection. After independence in 1963, the country
abolished user fees that had been imposed on health ser-
vices at public facilities by the colonial government [13].
The Kenyan health sector was predominantly tax funded
until 1989, at which point the country introduced user
fees in public hospitals and peripheral health facilities
(health centers and dispensaries) that offer outpatient pri-
mary healthcare services [13, 14]. However, due to social
justice concerns, user fees were abolished in 1990, but
reintroduced again in 1992 because of budgetary con-
straints [14, 15]. In 2004, the Kenyan government abol-
ished user fees in public health centers and dispensaries,
except for a flat registration fee of Kenyan shillings (KES)
10 in dispensaries and KES 20 in health centers, which
translates to US dollar (USD) 0.1 and USD 0.2 respectively
[15]. Public hospitals were however allowed to continue
collecting user fees under a cost-sharing arrangement
where hospitals received partial supply side subsidies from
the central government, and charged fees to users of
healthcare services. In 2013, after the election of a new
government, user fees were completely abolished in health
centers and dispensaries [16].
Despite the abolition of user fees at public health cen-
ters and dispensaries, OOP payments continue to be a
problem in the Kenyan health system. A number of fac-
tors could explain this. First, services at public hospitals
(which still operate under the cost-sharing policy) as
well as all levels of private healthcare facilities are still
paid for through OOP payments. Second, health insur-
ance coverage in Kenya remains low even though it has
increased from 10 to 17.1% between 2007 and 2013 [17].
Of those covered by health insurance, 99% are covered
by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), a state
entity with the mandate to provide social health insur-
ance, while the remaining 1% is covered by private and
community based health insurance [17]. However, health
insurance mobilizes only 5% of current health expend-
iture in Kenya, implying that the depth of cover is low,
and hence necessitating OOP (Table 1). Further, the
health sector continues to be under-prioritized by the
government. While the Abuja declaration recommends
Table 1 Selected health financing indicators for Kenya
Year
Indicator 2007 2013
Proportion of Kenyans covered by health insurance [17] 10.0% 17.1%
Financing sources as a percentage of total health expenditure (THE) [62] 2009 2013
Percentage of THE financed by public sources 28.8% 33.5%
Percentage of THE financed by donors 34.5% 25.6%
Percentage of THE financed by private sources 36.7% 39.8%
Percentage of THE paid for through Out-of-pocket expenditure 25% 29%
Total health expenditure (THE) per capita (USD) 55.8 66.6
THE as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 5.4% 6.8%
Government health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure 4.6% 6.1%
Public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 1.6% 2.3%
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that governments allocate at least 15% of their budgets
to the health sector [18], Kenya allocated 6.1%. Further,
while it has been recommended that, for countries to ac-
celerate progress towards achieving UHC, government’s
expenditure on health should at least be 5% of their
GDP [19], Kenya’s share was 2.1% in 2013.
OOP payments deter some Kenyans from seeking care
and cause others to become impoverished as a result of
paying for care. A previous study by Chuma and col-
leagues estimated that 14.8% of households experienced
catastrophic healthcare expenditure in 2007 [20]. Fur-
ther it was estimated that nearly 1.5 million Kenyans
were pushed into poverty due to catastrophic health
spending [20]. In this paper we present an analysis of
catastrophic costs and impoverishment using the most
recent data from the 2013 Kenya Household Expend-
iture and Utilization Survey (KHHEUS). The objectives
of this study are to 1) examine the incidence and inten-
sity of catastrophic health expenditures, 2) to examine
the impoverishing effect of OOP health spending, and,
3) to explore factors that are associated with cata-
strophic health spending in Kenya.
Our analysis contributes to the policy dialogue around
UHC in Kenya and as well as the broader literature on
catastrophic health spending in three ways. First, by using
recent data, it provides policy makers with information to
take stock of progress (or lack thereof) on improving fi-
nancial risk protection among the population, and pro-
vides a benchmark for the future. Second, unlike the
analysis by Chuma and colleagues, and most analyses that
only consider catastrophe and impoverishment due to dir-
ect payments made to healthcare providers, we also con-
sider the impact of transport costs borne by users to
access healthcare services. This is based on the recogni-
tion that transport costs are often quite significant when
compared to direct payments to healthcare providers [9].
Third, unlike the analysis by Chuma and colleagues, we
explore the association between catastrophic health
spending and a range of individual, household, and
county-level covariates. Literature is scarce on factors as-
sociated with catastrophic healthcare expenditures [21].
Identifying these relationships provides policy levers that
can be targeted by decision makers interested in interven-
ing to improve financial risk protection in Kenya [21].
Methods
Study setting
Kenya is a lower middle income country in East Africa
with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
USD 1245. It has an estimated population of 44.86 mil-
lion [22], 45.9% of which are estimated to be living
below the national poverty line [23]. Kenya’s population
is predominantly rural, with an estimated 65% of the
population living in rural areas [17]. The country
operates under a devolved system with two levels of
governance: the national government and 47 semi-
autonomous devolved units called county governments
[24]. The Kenyan healthcare delivery system is pluralistic
with a 50–50% split between public and private health-
care provision. Healthcare providers are organized into
four tiers, namely community, primary care, county re-
ferral and national referral [25, 26]. Community health
services include all community-based demand creation
activities that are guided by the Ministry of Health
(MOH) community strategy [25, 26]. Primary healthcare
include services provided by public and private mater-
nity homes, health centers and dispensaries. County re-
ferral services include first level referral hospitals that
are managed by a given county. National referral ser-
vices are comprised of national level facilities, where
tertiary referral services are provided.
Data sources
This analysis is based on the 2013 KHHEUS [17]. The
KHHEUS collects detailed data on socio-demographic
characteristics of households and individuals, household
expenditures, healthcare spending, and individual level
data on outpatient attendance (over a 4 week recall
period) and inpatient hospitalization (over a 12 month
recall period). The KHHEUS sample was drawn from
the master sample developed and maintained by the
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) based on a
multistage sampling design [17]. The Kenya KHHEUS
2013 has a sample of 33,675 households drawn from
1347 selected clusters comprised of 533 (40%) urban
and 814 (60%) rural clusters. The sample did not include
institutionalized individuals. This sample was drawn
from 44 out of the 47 counties in Kenya, because three
counties, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa, were not in-
cluded in the survey. This was because the sampling
clusters had not been updated in the KNBS master sam-
ple [17]. However, the sample was constructed to allow
for representativeness at both the national and county
levels as well as urban and rural domains.
Of the individuals sampled, 19.3% reported illness in
the four weeks preceding the survey [17]. Of these, 80%
sought care; care was forgone by 20% of individuals that
had reported illness in the four weeks preceding the sur-
vey for a number of reasons that included 1) prohibitive
costs of care 2) long distances to health facilities, and 3)
illness not considered serious enough [17].
Data analysis
Measuring the incidence and intensity of catastrophic
spending
There is no consensus on the threshold for catastrophic
health payments. In this analysis, households were con-
sidered to have incurred catastrophic expenditures if
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their total out of-pocket health costs in a year exceeded
40% of their annual non-food expenditure (referred to as
capacity to pay) [9]. We chose this threshold given that
it considers the effective income remaining after basic
subsistence needs have been met, rather than the total
household expenditure, and therefore represents the true
capacity to pay for healthcare expenditure. In this paper,
we analyzed the incidence of catastrophe due to direct
healthcare payments (i.e. payments made to healthcare
providers for services received) and also due to health-
care and transport payments (i.e. transport costs in-
curred for a return trip to and from a healthcare
facility). To obtain healthcare OOP spending, we sub-
tracted costs that were covered by health insurance (or
other payment mechanisms such as borrowing without
the expectation of paying back) from the total reported
healthcare cost. Since the survey used a 4 week recall
period for outpatient services, we annualized the out-
patient OOP by multiplying them by 13. We classified
households into wealth quintiles by using per capita con-
sumption expenditure.
The catastrophic head count (HC), which represents
the incidence of catastrophe, refers to the proportion of
households that incurred catastrophic health payments




Where N is the sample size while E is an indicator that
assumes a value of 1 if the OOP payments of a house-
hold i exceed the defined catastrophic expenditure
threshold, and 0 if it does not. While catastrophic head
count estimates the fraction of households that incur
catastrophic costs, it does not give information on the
extent of catastrophe (by how much a households OOP
payment exceeds the catastrophic threshold). The cata-
strophic overshoot (O) provides this information. Cata-
strophic overshoot refers to the average degree by which
OOP payments, as a proportion of total expenditure, ex-
ceeds the catastrophic payment threshold (Z). Cata-







Where Ti represents the OOP payments of household
i, Xi represents the household non-food consumption
expenditure of household i, and Z represents the cata-
strophic threshold. Subsequently, the average cata-





The intensity of catastrophic expenditure is computed by
averaging the catastrophic overshoot over all households
that exceed the catastrophic threshold. This measure, re-





Distributional profile of catastrophic incidence and intensity
The distributional profile of the incidence and intensity
of catastrophic payments was assessed by computing
concentration indices. The concentration index is de-
rived by computing the covariance between the frac-
tional rank of the individual sorted by socio-economic
status and the variable of interest [27]. The index as-
sumes a value ranging from −1 to +1. A negative con-
centration index indicates that the variable of interest is
concentrated among the poor and vice versa [28]. The
“traditional” concentration index is only appropriate
when the variable of interest is measured on a ratio-
scale [27]. Applying the “traditional” concentration index
to binary (and bounded) variables, such as the incidence
of catastrophic expenditure, is therefore problematic
[29–31]. Wagstaff [32] and Erreygers [31] have proposed
corrected concentration indices. While there is no con-
sensus on which corrected concentration index is super-
ior to the other [30, 33, 34], we chose to compute
Erreygers concentration index [31]. Erreygers concentra-
tion index E(h) is computed as follows [31]:





z ¼ nþ 1
2
−λi
And, n is the number of individuals in a given popula-
tion, λi denotes the socioeconomic rank of the individual
ranging from the richest (λi = 1) to the poorest (λi = n), hi
is the level of the variable of interest for individual i, bh is
the upper bound of the variable of interest, and ah is the
lower bound of the variable of interest. Erreygers concen-
tration index satisfies the four criteria argued by Erreygers
to be essential [29, 31] namely, 1) transfer: A small trans-
fer of the variable of interest from a richer to a poorer in-
dividual is translated into a pro-poor change in the
concentration index, 2) mirror: The concentration index
of the presence of the variable of interest, and the concen-
tration index of the shortfall of the variable of interest
should be mirror images of each other, 3) level independ-
ence: An equal increment of the variable of interest for all
individuals does not affect the concentration index, 4)
Cardinal invariance: A linear transformation of the vari-
able of interest does not affect the value of the index.
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Health care spending and impoverishment
To assess the impact of OOP (both pure health care and
healthcare plus transport) payments on poverty esti-
mates, we first specified a poverty line by adopting the
Kenya national poverty line of consumption expenditure
of Kenya shillings 1562 (USD 15.62) for rural areas and
Kenya shillings 2913 (USD 29.13) for urban areas per in-
dividual per month [35]. We then estimated the poverty
levels of households and individuals before making
healthcare payments (gross of OOP spending) and after
making healthcare payments (net of OOP spending [36].
Three measures are presented: (1) the poverty head
count represents the fraction of households living below
the defined poverty line; (2) the poverty gap represents
the aggregate deficit from the poverty line; (3) the nor-
malised poverty gap, which is computed by dividing the
estimated poverty gap by the defined poverty line.
Examining factors associated with catastrophic costs
We developed a logistic regression model to examine the
association of the incidence of catastrophic expenditures
and a range of household level and county level covariates.
We developed two models, one with catastrophic expend-
iture due to healthcare costs as the dependent variable,
and a second one with catastrophic expenditure due to
healthcare and transport costs as the dependent variable.
Covariates were selected based on findings from litera-
ture on determinants of catastrophic expenditures [9,
37–40]. Household level covariates included: 1) the age
of household head, specified as a categorical variable
with 5 categories (less than 25 years, 25–34 years, 35–
44 years, 45–55 years and greater than 55 years), 2) the
gender of the household head, specified as a binary vari-
able (male or female), 3) the employment status of the
household head, specified as a binary variable (employed
or unemployed), 4) the socio-economic status of the
household, specified as a categorical variable (quintile 1
(poorest), quintile 2, quintile 3, quintile 4, quintile 5
(richest), 5) the household size, specified as a continuous
variable, 6) the proportion of household members with
some form of health insurance, specified as continuous
variable, 7) the presence of at least one household mem-
ber with a chronic disease (hypertension, diabetes, can-
cer, arthritis, other), specified as a binary variable
(presence or absence of a chronic disease diagnosis), 8)
the presence of at least one elderly (greater than 60 years
of age) member of a household, specified as a binary
variable (presence or absence of an elderly member), 9)
the number of healthcare facilities (public, private, faith
based) in the county where the household is located,
specified as continuous variable, 10) the per capita total
healthcare expenditure in the county where the house-
hold is located, specified as a continuous variable, 11)
the region where the household is located, specified as
binary variable (rural or urban), and 12) the status of
marginalization of the county where the household is lo-
cated, specified as binary variable (marginalized or non-
marginalized). The marginalization status of the counties
is based on the Kenya County Marginalization index,
which is a composite index developed by the Kenyan
county revenue authority to characterize counties ac-
cording to the extent to which they are marginalized
[41]. The CDI has been developed by combining the
poverty status (weight =0.28), education status (weight =
0.28), health status (weight = 0.28) and infrastructure en-
dowment (weight 0.16) of each county to develop a
composite index with values ranging from 0 to 1 [41].
Counties with CDI values lower than the national aver-
age (0.6) are classified as marginalized while counties
with a CDI greater than 0.6 are classified as non-
marginalized [41]. Based on this classification, there are
20 marginalized and 27 non marginalized counties [41].
Standard techniques were applied to test for model fit.
Data were analyzed using STATA (Version 12).
Results
OOP health spending to cover direct healthcare costs and
transportation to seek care
Table 2 presents the proportion of households reporting
an illness in the 4 weeks preceding the survey.
Table 3 presents estimates of average household OOP
spending in a year for all households. Mean annual OOP
health spending was KES 5325.12 for outpatient services
and KES 941.04 for hospital admissions. Additionally,
households on average spent KES 1966.67 on transport to
and from a facility to seek outpatient and/or inpatient care.
Transport costs therefore equaled almost a third (31.39%)
of direct healthcare (inpatient plus outpatient) costs, and
comprised 23.89% of total (direct healthcare plus transport)
costs incurred to access healthcare (Fig. 1). The proportion
Table 2 Proportion of households reporting illness over a









1 (Poorest) 3332 5759 57.86% (56.6–59.1%)
2 3310 5763 57.44% (56.1–58.7%)
3 3374 5763 58.55% (57.3–59.8%)
4 3424 5762 59.42% (58.1–60.7%)
5 (Richest) 3304 5762 57.34% (56.1–58.6%)
Region
Rural 10,575 17,524 60.35% (59.62–61.07%)
Urban 6169 11,285 54.67% (53.74–55.59%)
Total 16,745 28,810 58.12% (57.55–58.69%)
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of transport costs to total costs incurred to access health-
care was higher among the poor (31.41% in the poorest
quintile) compared to the rich (17.50% in the richest quin-
tile). Richer households incurred higher OOP (health care,
transport and total) costs to access healthcare services com-
pared to poorer households. Further OOP costs for house-
holds residing in urban regions were higher than those
residing in rural regions.
Direct OOP spending for outpatient services were the
greatest driver (64.68%) of total OOP health spending
(direct healthcare and transport costs), while payments
for medicines comprised the highest proportion
(44.57%) of direct healthcare payments (outpatient and
inpatient OOP) (Fig. 1).
Figure 2 shows the share of total household expend-
iture that went towards OOP payments among all
households. Overall, OOP payments made directly to
healthcare providers to access outpatient and inpatient
services, expenditure on transportation to access care,
and total OOP payments (direct payments to healthcare
providers plus return trip costs) represented 3.14, 1.37
and 4.51% of a household’s total annual consumption ex-
penditures respectively. The poorest households and
those living in rural regions spent the largest share of
their annual budgets on healthcare compared to richer
households and those living in urban areas respectively.
For instance, the share of household annual budgets that
was spent by the poorest household (quintile 1) to access
healthcare (healthcare and transport costs) was 3 times
(7.04%) that of the richest (quintile 5) households
(2.34%). For rural households, their budget share for
total OOP (healthcare and transport) costs was 5.16%
compared to 3.47% for urban households.
Impoverishing effects of Catastrophic Expenditure
Table 4 outlines the estimates of the incidence and inten-
sity of catastrophic health payments. Overall, the inci-
dence of catastrophe was 4.52% when only healthcare
OOP payments made directly to healthcare providers
were considered, and rose to 6.57% when both direct
healthcare OOP payments and transport costs were con-
sidered. Richer households had a significantly lower
Fig. 1 Share of OOP payments to access healthcare services
Fig. 2 Mean proportion of annual OOP payments to household annual consumption budgets for all households
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incidence of catastrophe compared to poorer households.
For instance while 1.29 and 2.40% of households in the
highest socio-economic quintile incurred catastrophic
costs due to healthcare and healthcare plus transport costs
respectively, the incidence of catastrophe in households in
the poorest socio-economic quintile was 9.92% (for
healthcare OOP costs) and 15.68% (for healthcare plus
transport OOP costs). Further, the incidence of catastro-
phe was significantly higher among households in rural
compared to households in urban regions of the country.
The mean positive overshoot was 3.75% when only
direct OOP paid to healthcare providers are considered
and 5.73% if both direct OOP costs paid to healthcare
providers and transport costs are considered. The mean
positive overshoot represents the extent to which OOP
payments exceed the defined catastrophic threshold
(40% of non-food budget share). The concentration indi-
ces are negative for both catastrophic expenditures and
overshoot, showing that both the incidence and intensity
of catastrophe are concentrated among the poor.
Figure 3 shows that the incidence of catastrophe due
to OOP costs incurred to access healthcare services var-
ied across the 47 Kenyan counties. Of the 47 counties,
level of catastrophic expenditure (for both direct health-
care costs, and direct healthcare plus transport costs)
was higher than the national average in 21 counties.
When healthcare OOP costs are considered, Turkana
county had the highest (17.36%) incidence, while
Makueni county had the lowest (1.57%). When both
healthcare and transport OOP costs were considered,
once again Turkana county had the highest (30.91%) in-
cidence, while Nakuru county had the lowest (2.59%).
Table 5 outlines the poverty head count before and after
accounting for OOP payments. The results reveal that
while 66.60% of individuals were already living below the
national poverty line before making any payments to access
healthcare services, this fraction increased by 1.17 percent-
age points and 1.60 percentage points after accounting for
healthcare OOP and healthcare plus transport OOP re-
spectively. This implies that an estimated 453,470 individ-
uals are pushed into poverty annually as a result of
healthcare OOP. When both direct payments made to
healthcare providers and transport OOP costs are consid-
ered, an estimated 619,541 individuals are pushed into pov-
erty annually. The poverty gap, which represents the
average deficit to reach the poverty line in the population
Table 4 Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditure
Total healthcare costs Transport Total (Healthcare plus transport)
Head count
Socio-economic status
1 (poorest) 9.92% (8.38–11.47%) 5.91% (4.51–7.32%) 15.68% (13.81–17.54%)
2 4.56% (3.81–5.31%) 1.12% (0.76–1.54%) 7.18% (6.24–8.11%)
3 4.47% (3.67–5.28%) 0.76% (0.04–1.03%) 5.81% (4.94–6.69%)
4 2.75% (2.19–3.32%) 0.25% (0.10–0.41%) 3.61% (2.95–4.27%)
5 (Richest) 1.92% (1.39–2.47%) 0.00% (0.00–0.02%) 2.40% (1.81–2.99%)
Regions
Urban 3.59% (2.92–4.25%) 0.38% (0.16–0.59%) 4.30% (3.58–5.02%)
Rural 5.01% (4.47–5.53%) 2.02% (1.59–2.46%) 7.78% (7.06–8.50%)
Weighted total head count 4.52% (4.10–4.93%) 1.46% (1.15–1.76%) 6.58% (6.03–7.12)
Overshoot
Socio-economic status
1 (poorest) 11.22% (7.63–14.81%) 5.74% (2.73–8.76%) 19.44% (13.87–25.01%)
2 4.25% (2.72–5.78%) 0.41% (0.26–0.56%) 5.64% (3.98–7.31%)
3 2.37% (1.62–3.13%) 0.27% (0.14–0.39%) 3.30% (2.40–4.20%)
4 1.73% (1.01–2.39%) 0.07% (0.00–0.13%) 2.11% (1.38–2.84%)
5 (Richest)
Regions
Urban 2.16% (1.45–2.86%) 0.10% (0.02–0.19%) 2.56% (1.81–3.33%)
Rural 4.58% (3.48–5.68%) 1.68% (0.86–2.49%) 7.39% (5.73–9.05%)
Weighted overshoot (OW) 3.75% (2.98–4.51%) 1.14% (0.60–1.67%) 5.73% (4.60–6.86%)
Concentration index, C_E −0.30 (−0.35–−0.26) −0.69 (−0.77–−0.61) −0.35 (−0.39–−0.32)
Concentration Index, C_O −0.53 (−0.71–−0.34) −0.80 (−1.11–−0.49) −0.57 (−0.72–−0.41)
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was KES 16,245.71 before accounting for any healthcare
OOP payments. This gap increased to KES 16,989.57 and
KES 17,239.39 when healthcare OOP and healthcare plus
transport OOP were accounted for respectively.
To graphically illustrate the impoverishing effects of
OOP payments, Fig. 4 shows Pen’s Parade for household
consumption gross of OOP made directly to healthcare
providers and for transport OOP. Household consump-
tion is expressed here as multiples of the Kenyan national
poverty line (PL). For each household, the vertical bar, or
“paint drip,” shows the extent to which the subtraction of
OOP payments reduces consumption. If a bar crosses the
poverty line, it means that this household is potentially
pushed into poverty due to OOP payments to access
healthcare. The graph shows that, a significant portion of
the population is already poor and that OOP payments
push them further into poverty. OOP payments are largest
in the highest (richest) quintile, while households in the
4th quintile are the ones that are pushed into poverty by
OOP payments to access healthcare.
Factors associated with the incidence of catastrophic
expenditure
Table 6 presents the results of logistic regression models
that examine the relationship between the incidence of
catastrophic health expenditure at the household level
and a range of individual, household and county level
co-variates. We developed two models, the first with a
binary variable measuring whether the household experi-
enced catastrophic expenditure due to direct OOP made
to healthcare providers as the dependent variable and
the second with a binary variable indicating whether dir-
ect healthcare plus transport OOP were catastrophic for
a household as the dependent variable.
Households had increased odds of incurring cata-
strophic expenditures due to healthcare costs if their
household head was older. For instance, households
whose heads were over 55 years of age had a 72% in-
creased odds incurring catastrophic expenditures due to
direct healthcare costs compared to households whose
heads were below 25 years of age (Odds ratio OR =1.72,
95% CI 1.15–2.58). A household with an unemployed
head had 75% more odds of incurring catastrophic ex-
penditure due to direct healthcare costs compared to a
household with an employed head (OR =1.75, 95% CI
1.42–2.16). Low social economic status also increased the
odds of a household incurring catastrophic expenditure.
For example, households in the poorest quintile had 5.61
times more odds of incurring catastrophic expenditure
due to direct healthcare costs compared to the households
in the richest quintile (OR = 5.61, 95% CI 3.83–8.22).
Other variables that increased the odds of incurring cata-
strophic costs due to direct healthcare costs include
household with a larger number of household members
Fig. 3 Incidence of catastrophic head count by county
Table 5 Poverty head count before and after OOP payments
Gross of total (health + transport)
payments
Net of health payments Net of transport payments Net of (health and transport)
payments
Poverty headcount 66.60% (64.95–68. 26%) 67.78% (66.15–69. 41%) 67.02% (65.37–68.67%) 68.21% (66.58–69.84%)
Poverty gap 16,245.71 (15,528.48–16,962.94) 16,989.57 (16,263.97–17,715.16) 16,465.69 (15,745.25–17,186.13) 17,239.39 (16,510.55–17,968.23)
Normalized poverty gap 30.26% (29.10–31.41%) 31.65% (30.50–32.81%) 30.72% (29.56–31.89%) 32.19% (31.02–33.36%)
Mean positive poverty gap 24391.74 (23656.09–25127.39) 25066.82 (24324.57–25809.07) 24568.1 (23833.54–25302.67) 25275.11 (24536.74–26013.47)
Normalized mean positive
poverty gap
45.43% (44.55–46.30%) 46.70% (45.84–47.57%) 45.84% (44.96–46.71%) 47.19% (46.32–48.06%)
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Fig. 4 Effect of OOP Payments on Household Consumption
Table 6 Logistic model estimation for likelihood of incurring Catastrophic Health Expenditure (CHE) [incurred CHE = 1, 0 = otherwise]
Catastrophic expenditure due to
healthcare OOP costs as the
dependent variable
Catastrophic expenditure due to
healthcare and transport OOP
costs as the dependent variable
Independent variables Odds Ratio (95% CI) Standard
error
P Value Odds Ratio (95% CI) Standard
error
P Value
Age of household head (reference = less than 25 years)
25 years–34 years 1.30 (1.05–1.62) 0.15 0.02 1.20 (1.00–1.45) 0.12 0.05
35 years–44 years 1.50 (1.08–2.08) 0.25 0.02 1.44 (1.09–1.91) 0.21 0.01
45 years–54 years 1.88 (1.31–2.71) 0.35 0.00 1.60 (1.17–2.18) 0.25 0.00
over 55 years 1.72 (1.15–2.58) 0.36 0.01 1.61 (1.14–2.28) 0.29 0.00
Gender of household head (reference = female) 1.01 (0.85–1.19) 0.08 0.94 1.08 (0.94–1.25) 0.08 0.28
Employment status of household head (reference =
employed)
1.75 (1.42–2.16) 0.19 0.00 1.61 (1.35–1.92) 0.15 0.00
Socio-economic status (reference = quintile 5 (richest))
Quintile 4 1.57 (1.09–2.27) 0.29 0.02 1.56 (1.15–2.13) 0.25 0.00
Quintile 3 2.65 (1.83–3.84) 0.50 0.00 2.57 (1.87–3.53) 0.42 0.00
Quintile 2 2.79 (1.97–3.95) 0.49 0.00 3.22 (2.39–4.35) 0.49 0.00
Quintile 1 (Poorest) 5.61 (3.83–8.22) 1.09 0.00 6.81 (4.99–9.28) 1.08 0.00
Household size (1.00–1.11) 0.03 0.04 1.04 (1.00–1.08) 0.02 0.04
Proportion of household members with health insurance
cover
1.44 (1.00–2.08) 0.27 0.05 1.25 (0.91–1.72) 0.20 0.17
Chronic disease diagnosis in the household (reference = no
chronic disease)
2.24 (1.87–2.68) 0.20 0.00 2.03 (1.75–2.34) 0.15 0.00
Presence of at least one elderly(>60 years) member in the
household (reference = no elderly member)
1.31 (1.02–1.68) 0.17 0.04 1.23 (1.01–1.51) 0.13 0.04
Number of healthcare facilities in the county 1.00 (1.00–1.00) 0.00 0.12 1.00 (1.00–1.00) 0.00 0.39
Per capita total health expenditure in the county 1.00 (1.00–1.02) 0.01 0.65 1.01 (1.00–1.02) 0.01 0.14
Region (reference = rural region) 0.89 (0.73–1.08) 0.09 0.23 0.72 (0.61–0.85) 0.06 0.00
Marginalization status of the county (reference =
non marginalized)
1.38 (1.14–1.67) 0.13 0.00 1.51 (1.29–1.78) 0.13 0.00
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(OR =1.05, 95% CI 1.00–1.11), households with a house-
hold member with a chronic disease (OR = 2.24, 95% CI
1.87–2.68) or an elderly household member (OR = 1.31,
95% CI 1.02–1.68), and households that were located in a
marginalized county (OR =1.38, 95% CI 1.14–1.67)
(Table 6). The same variables were significantly associated
with an increased odds of the incidence of CE due to dir-
ect healthcare plus transport costs (Table 6).
Discussion
This study presents a detailed analysis of catastrophic
health spending in Kenya using the most recent nation-
ally representative household survey. Direct comparison
of our findings with those from other settings is limited
by differences in methodological choices such as how
health expenditure was measured and choice of the
threshold for catastrophic health expenditures. This not-
withstanding, our findings appear to be comparable to
those reported elsewhere in the Sub-Saharan Africa re-
gion [42, 43]. For example, using the 40% of non-food
expenditure threshold, a recent study in Zambia re-
ported an incidence of catastrophic expenditure to direct
healthcare costs of 4.00%, which increased to 9.30%
when transport costs were included [43].
When compared to similar analysis in Kenya from pre-
vious periods, our results show that the country is mov-
ing in the right direction. Compared to 2007, when
14.8% of Kenyan households incurred catastrophic ex-
penditures due to direct costs of healthcare [20], only
4.52% of households incurred catastrophic expenditure
due to direct costs healthcare in 2013. As a result, while
close to 1.5 million Kenyans were pushed into poverty
due to OOP direct costs of healthcare in 2007 [20], this
number reduced to 453,470 in 2013. While this analysis
does not explore the causes for this reduction, we sus-
pect that this could be in part the result of a recent gov-
ernment policy to abolish user fees at public primary
healthcare facilities (health centers and dispensaries) in
2013 [16]. In the context of the finding that outpatient
care contributes the greatest proportion (64.68%) of dir-
ect healthcare costs, and the observation that the great-
est proportion (40.10%) of outpatient visits occur in
public primary healthcare facilities (health centers and
dispensaries) [17], the user fee removal policy has the
potential for significantly increasing financing risk pro-
tection among the Kenyan population.
Further, the fact that the level of catastrophic expend-
iture due to direct healthcare costs is still high reinforces
the observation made in other countries that user fee re-
moval is not enough. For example studies from Uganda,
Bukina Faso and Zambia reported that user fee removal
did not reduce, and sometimes even increased OOP pay-
ments to access healthcare services [43–46]. In the three
countries, this was attributed to poor quality of care in
healthcare facilities, such as the unavailability of essential
medicines and supplies [43–46]. It is likely that similar
reasons explain the persistence of catastrophic expendi-
tures due to direct healthcare costs in Kenya. Indeed
data from the KHHES 2013 shows that lack of trained
personnel and medicines were the leading reasons for
patients bypassing facilities closer to them when seeking
care (data not shown). Further, data from the KHHEUS
2013 shows that approximately 39.90% of those who
sought care in public primary healthcare facilities did
incur some direct OOP expenditure (data not shown).
This implies poor adherence to the policy, at least at the
time of the survey. This finding adds to the evidence
that financial risk protection is closely related to the
quality of care offered in healthcare facilities and the fi-
delity of implementation of free care policies [47].
Our results highlight the financial burden that paying
for transportation to healthcare facilities poses for Ken-
yan households and especially the poor. It is worth not-
ing that assessments of catastrophic health spending in
LMICs typically focus on direct healthcare payments,
and customarily ignore other indirect costs such as the
cost of transportation to the health facility. The seeming
vulnerability among the poor is not only due to the poor
having lower incomes, but also because a significant pro-
portion of the poor live in rural and marginalized re-
gions of the country, where access to healthcare facilities
is limited because facilities are few and far between. Our
study thus adds to the growing evidence that transport
costs comprise a significant proportion of OOP health-
care costs. For example, findings from Zambia report
that transport costs comprised 73.00% of OOP costs in-
curred access healthcare services in Zambia [43]. Trans-
port has been identified as a significant barrier to access
in a number of settings [48–50].
Our findings also reinforces evidence from other set-
tings that outpatient care and costs of medicines are the
greatest cost drivers of direct OOP costs paid to health-
care facilities [43, 51]. This finding is important given that
often health financing schemes, and specifically social
health insurance schemes in LMICs do not adequately
and or/explicitly cover the cost of medicines and out-
patient care [52]. For example, at the time of collecting
data for the KHHEUS 2013, the Kenyan NHIF provided
an inpatient care only benefit package and did not expli-
citly include medicines in the package. While the NHIF
expanded its benefit package to include outpatient care in
2015, essential medicines are still not explicitly included.
Our study offers some insight into who amongst the
Kenyan population are most vulnerable to catastrophic
expenditures. Households that are larger, poorer, have an
unemployed head, have a member with a chronic ail-
ment such as diabetes of hypertension, have an elderly
member, or live in marginalized regions of the country
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have an increased odds of incurring catastrophic expen-
ditures. These findings are consistent with evidence
from other settings on the determinants of the incidence
of catastrophic health expenditures. For example, the
presence of a household member with a chronic illness,
or the unemployment of the household head were found
to increase the odds of a household incurring cata-
strophic health expenditures in Nepal [53], China [37],
Kenya [54], and Ghana [51]. Larger household sizes were
also found to increase odd of incurring catastrophic
health expenditures in Ghana [51] and Iran [55].
Our findings on the influence of health insurance on
health spending add to the mixed findings from the litera-
ture on this topic. While some studies have found that
having health insurance reduces the odds of incurring
catastrophic health expenditures [9, 51, 56, 57], findings in
other settings have shown that the expansion of health in-
surance does not necessarily increase financial risk protec-
tion in the population [52, 58, 59]. Despite the increase in
health insurance coverage from 10.00 to 17.10% between
2007 and 2013 [17] in Kenya, our analysis does not find
health insurance to be protective of catastrophic expendi-
tures. This could be explained by a number of reasons.
First, as mentioned previously, at the time of collecting
data for the KHHEUS, the NHIF benefit package did not
include outpatient services. As we have shown, outpatient
costs are significant cost drivers of OOP in Kenya. Second,
the NHIF in Kenya majorly contracts hospitals to provide
healthcare services to its members, while the majority of
outpatient visits in Kenya are in primary healthcare facil-
ities [17]. Third, access to care by NHIF members is se-
verely constrained; the network of facilities contracted by
NHIF to provide services to its members is small (ap-
proximately 1400 facilities out of approximately 10,000
healthcare facilities in Kenya), with most of these being in
Urban areas [60]. The majority of Kenyan live in rural
regions of the country.
Implications for policy
Our analysis has a number of implications for policy in
Kenya and similar settings. First, the design of health fi-
nancing mechanisms should prioritize the cost drivers of
OOP spending. For example, social health insurance
schemes, such as the NHIF in Kenya, should explicitly
include essential medicines in their benefit packages.
Further, in addition to policies to remove user fees paid
directly to health facilities, policy makers should explore
policies to reduce the burden of transport costs espe-
cially among the poor, and the vulnerable. For example,
while the government of Kenya has implemented a free
maternity healthcare programme and introduced a
health insurance subsidy for the poor programme [60],
they should explore introducing transport vouchers to
further reduce the financial burden of accessing care.
Second, policies aimed at providing financial risk pro-
tection should prioritize vulnerable groups in the popula-
tion. For instance, interventions for prevalent chronic
diseases such as diabetes and hypertension should be in-
cluded in benefit packages of UHC schemes. Further, in
extending coverage, special priority should be given to the
poor, the elderly and those living in rural and marginalized
regions of the country. While the Kenyan government has
introduced an insurance subsidy programme for the poor
and the elderly, these remain pilots funded by donors and
therefore have very limited coverage [60]. The Kenyan
government should allocate a budget for scaling up cover-
age to these vulnerable segments of the population.
Third, efforts at reducing financial barriers to access can
only succeed if accompanied by efforts to remove supply
side bottlenecks. Specifically, the Kenyan government
should invest in increasing geographical access to health-
care facilities among the population, especially those in
the rural and marginalized regions of the country. The
NHIF should also scale up the number of facilities it con-
tracts to provide healthcare services to its members, and
specifically focusing on increasing the numbers of primary
healthcare facilities, and the network of contracted facil-
ities in rural and marginalized areas. The Kenyan govern-
ment should also prioritize implementing measures to
improve the quality of care in health facilities. The govern-
ment should strengthen the supply chain and availability
of essential medicines and supplies in public healthcare fa-
cilities, while the NHIF should strengthen its purchasing
function to ensure that essential medicines and supplies
are available in both the public and private facilities that it
contracts to provide services for its members.
Study limitations
The KHHEUS was conducted in 2013, which makes it
outdated. However, KHHEUS is the only data source
that provides detailed information on health consump-
tion patterns at the household-level in Kenya, and the
2013 round is the most recent round. Further, as has
been observed by others, surveys such as the KHHEUS
rely on self-reported data on healthcare use, which is
susceptible recall bias [61].
Conclusion
KHHEUS 2013 offers us the most recent estimate of cata-
strophic health spending in Kenya. While there is an ob-
served decline in both the incidence of catastrophic health
spending and its impoverishing effects, the levels are still
unacceptably high especially among the poor. There are
signs that recent government of Kenya reforms, specifically
the user fee removal policy might have contributed to in-
creased financial risk protection among the poor. The fact
however that CHE persist in the Kenyan population means
that the Kenyan government has to do more to not only
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ensure that prepayment mechanisms are scaled up and ad-
hered to, but that supply side bottlenecks such as quality of
care and geographical access to facilities are improved. It is
also clear from our analysis that transport costs comprise a
significant portion of OOP and should be given policy pri-
ority by policy makers, especially among the poor.
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